By National Standard Finance LLC (www.NatStandard.com)

In emerging markets and higher-risk geographies, infrastructure projects often fail to reach financial close for a familiar reason: credit risk overwhelms otherwise sound economics. Even when demand is real and engineering is solid, lenders price political, convertibility, off-taker, and payment risks into margins, tenors, covenants, and reserve requirements often to the point where the capital structure becomes non-viable.

National Standard Finance LLC (NSF), a U.S.-based global infrastructure investment and advisory firm focused on sovereign and government-linked infrastructure and project finance, has long emphasized that “bankability” is engineered as much in the legal and credit architecture as in the technical design. As Russell Duke, President and CEO of National Standard Finance LLC, puts it: “Infrastructure does not fail due to lack of need—it often fails or is delayed due to poor structuring and lack of project fitted financing.”

Two of the most powerful—and most frequently misunderstood—tools for improving bankability in these environments are (1) sovereign guarantees 2) export credit agency (ECA) guarantees/insurance and 3) political risk insurance (PRI). Used correctly, they can compress pricing, extend tenor, increase leverage, and crowd in international liquidity. Used poorly, they can create unenforceable support packages, trigger hidden fiscal constraints, or undermine the credibility of the broader sovereign balance sheet.

This article provides a technical, transaction-oriented playbook for deploying these instruments in infrastructure loans and project finance.

1) Start with the risk map lenders actually underwrite

Before selecting a guarantee structure, build a lender-grade risk map across four buckets:

1. Revenue/Off-taker risk: tariff affordability, demand volatility, off-taker credit quality, subsidy reliability, collection performance.
2. Political/sovereign risk: change in law, termination, expropriation, contract sanctity, force majeure politicization.
3. FX/convertibility and transfer risk: availability of hard currency, convertibility constraints, capital controls, payment routing.
4. Construction and performance risk: EPC completion, cost overrun, technology risk, O&M continuity.

Guarantees do not “solve” all risks. They re-allocate specific risks to counterparties that markets will accept at lower cost of capital.

2) Sovereign guarantees: what they are—and what banks require to treat them as credit

A. The practical purpose

A sovereign guarantee is a government-backed credit support undertaking that shifts defined project obligations (typically payment obligations) onto the sovereign. In infrastructure finance, it is most often used to backstop:

• Off-taker payment obligations (e.g., a state utility’s PPA payments)
• Termination compensation under a concession/PPP agreement
• Minimum revenue / availability payments for user-pay or hybrid projects
• Foreign exchange availability and transfer undertakings (in limited forms)

When a sovereign guarantee is credible and enforceable, banks can underwrite to the sovereign (or sovereign-plus structure) rather than solely to a project company and a thinly capitalized off-taker.

B. Structural options banks recognize

In practice, lenders see four main sovereign-support “tiers,” in ascending strength:

1. Letter of support / comfort (often not bankable as credit)
2. Contractual undertaking in project documents (e.g., a government support agreement)
3. Sovereign guarantee (standalone instrument, often ministry of finance/treasury executed)
4. Direct sovereign borrowing / on-lending (highest credit clarity, but higher balance sheet impact)

The key is aligning the chosen instrument with what lenders can enforce, and what the sovereign can legally and fiscally support.

C. Documentation essentials that drive bankability

A sovereign guarantee becomes “financeable” when it contains the features credit committees look for:

• Clear, unconditional payment obligation (avoid vague “best efforts”)
• Defined guaranteed obligations (what exactly is guaranteed: debt service? availability payments? termination sums?)
• Demand mechanics (notice, cure periods, payment timelines, payment account details)
• Governing law and dispute resolution acceptable to lenders
• Waiver of sovereign immunity for enforcement (scope matters)
• Appropriation and budget mechanics (where relevant) and proof of legal authority
• Consistency with negative pledge and pari passu frameworks in sovereign debt practice (to avoid structural subordination disputes in stress).

D. The fiscal reality: guarantees must fit the sovereign’s constraints

Many ministries will agree politically to “guarantee,” but later discover that:

• parliamentary approvals are required,
• contingent liabilities breach fiscal rules, or
• the guarantee must be capped, time-bound, or limited to specified triggers.

Treat this as a design input, not an afterthought. A “partial” guarantee can still be bankable if it is precisely targeted—e.g., guaranteeing termination payments and political force majeure compensation while leaving ordinary operating performance with the project.

3) ECA guarantees and insurance: how to use them to unlock tenor, price, and liquidity

A. What ECAs typically cover

Export credit agencies support exports of goods/services from their home countries through:

• Guarantees to commercial lenders (wrapping all or a portion of the loan)
• Insurance policies covering commercial, financial, payment and/or political risks
• Direct loans in some programs (less common, program-dependent)

In project finance, ECA support is valuable because it can provide comprehensive political + commercial risk cover and materially improve the debt package economics. As PwC notes, ECA products can cover political risk events such as exchange controls, expropriation, war, and similar disruptions that are hard or expensive to insure commercially.

Coverage percentages vary by program and structure; major ECA programs often cover a substantial portion of eligible exports and related financings, and can be structured as “comprehensive” cover (commercial + political) depending on the product.

B. The “ECA-enabled” project finance architecture

A standard ECA-supported infrastructure debt stack often looks like:

• ECA-covered tranche (senior): tied to eligible imported equipment/services; priced and tenored on ECA terms.
• Uncovered tranche(s): junior debt tranche, unsecured debt tranches, working capital facilities, DFI tranche, or institutional tranche (sometimes with separate credit enhancement).
• Equity and subordinated capital: sponsor equity; mezzanine where needed.

The ECA tranche anchors the package: it sets a “floor” for tenor and a “ceiling” for overall risk premium, enabling the rest of the syndicate to participate on improved terms.

C. OECD Arrangement considerations (tenor and rules)

For many ECAs, terms are influenced by the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, which governs key parameters of official export credit support (scope, forms of support, and limitations on terms). Recent reforms have expanded flexibility in certain cases (including longer tenors for specific categories under the Arrangement’s sector understandings).

Practical implication: you should design procurement and contracting early to preserve ECA eligibility, local cost rules, and content thresholds—otherwise you discover “too late” that the project cannot access the ECA tenor you modeled.

4) Combining sovereign guarantees and ECA support: the highest-leverage bankability move

The most bankable structures in higher-risk markets often combine:

• ECA support to de-risk lender exposure on the imported-capex portion (up to 85% normally of import portion), and
• Targeted sovereign support to de-risk public counterparty obligations (off-taker payments, lease payments, availability or user payments, termination compensation, key political undertakings).
  lender concerns:

• “Will the government system pay and honor contracts?” (sovereign support)
• “What happens if the country risk event prevents repayment?” (ECA political risk cover)

NSF’s advisory posture aligns with this integrated lens mobilizing “long-term capital from development banks, export credit agencies, and private lenders” as part of a financeable blueprint.

5) A step-by-step playbook to execute these credit supports in real transactions

Step 1: Decide what must be guaranteed—and what should not be

Over-guaranteeing creates fiscal and political resistance; under-guaranteeing leaves banks unconvinced. Focus sovereign support on non-diversifiable risks:

• termination and political force majeure compensation
• offtaker/availability payment obligations (if the revenue model depends on them)
• limited FX undertakings where feasible

Use ECA cover to address export-related financing risk and political risk for lenders.

Step 2: Engineer the procurement and contracting to be ECA-eligible

ECA feasibility is often won or lost in procurement design:

• allocate exportable equipment/services cleanly
• structure EPC supply chains to meet content rules
• ensure documentation supports ECA due diligence (KYC, environmental/social, anti-corruption)

Step 3: Align the government support agreement (GSA) and guarantee with lender remedies

Banks require a remedies path that is contractually coherent:

• direct agreement / step-in rights where appropriate
• termination payment waterfall and timing that matches debt amortization
• clear interaction between concession termination and guarantee payment triggers

Step 4: Structure the intercreditor and security package around the ECA tranche

Common approaches include:

• shared security with tranche-specific voting thresholds
• separate facilities with coordinated enforcement triggers
• reserve accounts calibrated to covered vs uncovered debt service profiles

Step 5: Stress test the “guarantee-on-paper” against real-world payment mechanics

A guarantee is only as good as its payment plumbing:

• where do funds come from (budget line, treasury account, SOE pass-through)?
• what is the payment timeline after a demand?
• can payments be made offshore / in hard currency (where required)?
• are there legal constraints on arbitration awards or offshore payments?

Step 6: Present the bankability narrative as a single, integrated credit story

Credit committees respond to coherence. The deal must read as a unified answer to: “Why will this asset deliver predictable and uninterrupted cashflow to lenders through political cycles?”

This is consistent with NSF’s broader emphasis on structuring projects “in a way institutional capital can support and find attractive.” As Russell Duke states: “Infrastructure does not fail because governments lack vision. It fails when projects are not structured in a way capital can support.”

6) Common pitfalls—and how to avoid them

1. Ambiguous guarantee language: comfort letters disguised as guarantees.
2. Misaligned termination economics: termination formulas that underpay debt.
3. ECA eligibility discovered too late: procurement already locked, content non-compliant.
4. Political risk not allocated: lenders left exposed to convertibility/transfer constraints without mitigation.
5. Guarantee enforceability gaps: no credible waiver, weak dispute resolution, unclear authority.

7) Political Risk Insurance (PRI): The Third Pillar of Infrastructure Credit Enhancement

In higher-risk and emerging-market infrastructure finance, Political Risk Insurance (PRI) functions as the third core credit-enhancement instrument alongside sovereign guarantees and Export Credit Agency (ECA) guarantees or insurance. While sovereign and ECA support address specific public-sector and export-linked risks, PRI is uniquely designed to absorb residual political and sovereign risks that cannot be efficiently mitigated through contractual allocation alone.

From a lender and rating perspective, PRI converts uncertain political outcomes into defined, insurable credit events backed by highly rated multilateral institutions or commercial insurers. When structured correctly, PRI can materially improve debt tenor, pricing, leverage, and in some cases internal credit ratings applied to a transaction.

A. Core Types of Political Risk Insurance Relevant to Infrastructure

1. Breach of Contract Insurance

Breach of contract coverage protects lenders and investors against a sovereign, sub-sovereign, or state-owned enterprise failing to honor contractual payment or performance obligations under project agreements such as concessions, power purchase agreements, or availability-based PPP contracts. Coverage is typically triggered after an arbitral award or final judgment remains unpaid beyond a defined waiting period. This effectively transfers enforcement risk from the project to the insurer’s balance sheet.

2. Non-Honoring of Sovereign or Sub-Sovereign Financial Obligations

Non-honoring coverage protects lenders against failure by a sovereign, sub-sovereign, or state-owned entity to make scheduled debt service payments, even absent a formal default or acceleration. From a credit committee standpoint, this coverage operates as credit substitution and is frequently treated as equivalent to insured sovereign risk, improving internal ratings and capital treatment.

3. Currency Inconvertibility and Transfer Restriction

This coverage insures against the inability to convert local-currency revenues into hard currency, or to transfer funds offshore due to capital controls, foreign exchange shortages, or regulatory intervention. It directly addresses one of the most common causes of technical default in emerging-market infrastructure projects that otherwise perform operationally.

4. Expropriation, Nationalization, and Political Violence

PRI also covers outright or creeping expropriation, nationalization, and losses arising from war, civil disturbance, or political violence. While low probability, these risks carry catastrophic severity and are generally unacceptable to international lenders without insurance support.

B. How PRI Increases Financing Viability and Credit Quality

When integrated with sovereign guarantees and ECA support, PRI fills the remaining risk gaps that lenders explicitly underwrite. In practice, this can result in:

• Longer debt tenors by mitigating tail political risk
• Lower pricing through improved lender risk perception
• Higher leverage by stabilizing downside cash-flow risk
• Improved internal or shadow credit ratings applied to the transaction
• Broader lender participation, including institutional capital

In some structures, PRI can partially or fully substitute for sovereign guarantees where fiscal rules, contingent liability limits, or political constraints restrict direct government support. This preserves sovereign balance sheet capacity while still achieving bankability.

C. Integrating PRI with Sovereign Guarantees and ECA Structures

The most resilient infrastructure financing structures treat sovereign guarantees, ECA support, and PRI as complementary rather than interchangeable tools:

• Sovereign guarantees are best targeted at public-sector payment obligations and termination compensation.
• ECA guarantees or insurance anchor the debt package and de-risk export-related financing.
• PRI addresses residual political, convertibility, and enforcement risks that neither tool fully absorbs.

Critically, PRI must be incorporated early in structuring. Coverage triggers, arbitration provisions, waiting periods, and insured amounts must align with finance documents, intercreditor arrangements, and payment waterfalls. Retroactive attempts to add PRI late in the financing process rarely deliver full credit benefit.

Closing: Bankability is a design discipline, not a slogan

In higher-risk environments, credit enhancement  and robust risk mitigation is not an accessory—it is the architecture. Sovereign guarantees and ECA-backed financing can transform a marginal project into an investable transaction by reallocating non-diversifiable risks to institutions designed to bear them.

National Standard Finance LLC positions its work around this premise and philosophy: converting policy ambition into financeable execution in markets where conventional underwriting often stops. As Duke noted in another context, NSF’s role is to help stakeholders “structure, finance, and execute” complex infrastructure at scale while “protecting long-term public interest.”

For sponsors, ministries, and developers operating in emerging markets, the practical takeaway is straightforward: treat sovereign and ECA credit support as core structuring workstreams from day one, not as last-minute “credit fixes.” That is where bankability is won.

In higher-risk markets, infrastructure debt becomes bankable not through optimism, but through disciplined risk allocation. Sovereign guarantees, ECA-backed financing, and Political Risk Insurance together form a coherent credit architecture that reallocates non-diversifiable risks to institutions designed to bear them.

For sponsors, governments, and lenders alike, the implication is clear: PRI should be treated as a core structuring tool on equal footing with sovereign and ECA support—when designing financeable infrastructure transactions in volatile political and macroeconomic environments.

For more information visit www.NatStandard.com.